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Abstract: Comparative biology builds up systematic knowledge of the diversity of life, across 
evolutionary lineages and levels of organization, starting with evidence from a sparse sample 
of model organisms. In developmental biology, a key obstacle to the growth of comparative 
approaches is that the concept of homology is not very well defined for levels of organization 
that are intermediate between individual genes and morphological characters. In this paper, we 
investigate what it means for ontogenetic processes to be homologous, focusing specifically on 
the examples of insect segmentation and vertebrate somitogenesis. These processes can be 
homologous without homology of the underlying genes or gene networks, since the latter can 
diverge over evolutionary time, while the dynamics of the process remain the same. 
Ontogenetic processes like these therefore constitute a dissociable level and distinctive unit of 
comparison requiring their own specific criteria of homology. In addition, such processes are 
typically complex and nonlinear, such that their rigorous description and comparison not only 
requires observation and experimentation, but also dynamical modeling. We propose six 
criteria of process homology, combining recognized indicators (sameness of parts, 
morphological outcome, and topological position) with novel ones derived from dynamical 
systems modeling (sameness of dynamical properties, dynamical complexity, and evidence for 
transitional forms). We show how these criteria apply to animal segmentation and other 
ontogenetic processes. We conclude by situating our proposed dynamical framework for 
homology of process in relation to similar research programs, such as process structuralism 
and developmental approaches to morphological homology. 
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1. Introduction: Why Process Homology? 
It has long been recognized that biology is best conducted in a comparative mode. The evolved 
diversity of life is a massive natural experiment, and hypotheses about its causes can be 
generated and tested through the use of comparative methods (Harvey and Pagel 1991). 
Distinguishing fundamental regulatory principles of ontogeny from accidental and contingent 
features also requires us to compare developmental systems across multiple evolutionary 
lineages. In addition, our ability to generalize insights gained from specific experimental model 
systems must be based on comparative principles, given that the number of evolutionary 
lineages to be studied vastly outnumbers our capacity to investigate each of them individually. 
Finally, a comparative approach to development in particular is essential for our understanding 
of the process of evolution itself, since changes in morphological traits are necessarily mediated 
by changes in the processes that generate them (e.g., Goodwin, 1982; Oster and Alberch, 1982; 
Webster and Goodwin, 1996; see also Amundson, 2005, and historical references therein). 
At the heart of comparative biology lies the concept of homology. In the words of David Wake 
(1994): "Homology is the central concept for all biology. Whenever we say that a mammalian 
hormone is the ‘same’ as a fish hormone, that a human sequence is the ‘same’ as a sequence in 
a chimp or a mouse, that a HOX gene is the ‘same’ in a mouse, a fruit fly, a frog, and a human—
even when we argue that discoveries about a roundworm, a fruit fly, a frog, a mouse, or a chimp 
have relevance to the human condition—we have made a bold and direct statement about 
homology." (Wake, 1994, p. 268). With the advent of evolutionary developmental biology, or 
evo-devo, developmental biology has become an increasingly comparative discipline, and “once 
a field becomes comparative, it must reckon with the idea of homology” (Cracraft 2005). 
Homology can hold between entities at many different levels of organization. Classical 
perspectives focus on the relationships of morphological characters, guided by Owen’s (1847) 
definition of a homologue as “the same organ in different animals under every variety of form 
and function.” After Darwin, “the same organ” was generally interpreted as “a feature of two or 
more taxa [...] derived from the same (or a corresponding) feature of their common ancestor” 
(Mayr 1982, p. 45; Lankester 1870). The transformation of “homology” into an evolutionary 
and ultimately phylogenetic concept led biologists to appreciate that almost any kind of 
characteristic could be homologized by being embedded in a comparative-phylogenetic 
framework (Serb and Oakley 2005). 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, homology was extended and applied to molecular genes, 
identified by their degree of sequence similarity (Patterson 1988). Homology has also been 
extended to gene regulatory networks (Abouheif 1999; Wagner 2007) and organismic 
behaviors (Lorenz 1958, 1965; Wenzel 1992). An important category of trait that has received 
much less attention is that of developmental processes, including gene expression dynamics, 
morphogenesis and cell differentiation, as well as processes that characterize life-cycles, such 
as metamorphosis or metagenesis. Following Striedter (1998) as well as Gilbert and Bolker 
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(2001), we argue that processes can and should be homologized, and this paper explores how 
this can be done. 
There are two major reasons why homology between ontogenetic processes[1] remains 
neglected: (1) persistent assumptions of one-to-one genotype–phenotype mapping, and (2) the 
difficulties of using processes as characters in phylogenetic analysis. 
First, as long as we assume that genotypes uniquely map onto phenotypes in a one-to-one 
fashion then neither ontogenetic processes nor morphological traits can vary independently of 
genetic changes. There is little point in establishing homology criteria for processes if processes 
are fully traceable in terms of gene homology. Over the past two decades, however, an 
increasing amount of evidence has accumulated indicating that evolution at different levels of 
organization is highly dissociable. Homologous morphological traits are often generated by 
processes involving non-homologous genes (developmental system drift), while homologous 
genes are often co-opted in the generation of non-homologous traits (deep homology) 
(Abouheif, 1997; True and Haag 2001; Shubin et al. 2009; Haag and True 2018; DiFrisco 
forthcoming). We now know that the relationship between evolution at the genotypic and the 
phenotypic level is surprisingly fluid, degenerate, multi-level, and complex (see, for example, 
DiFrisco and Jaeger 2019; DiFrisco and Jaeger 2020; DiFrisco forthcoming). As a result, 
homology between processes cannot always be traced in terms of homology between genes. 
Therefore, phylogenetic comparison of ontogenetic processes requires criteria specific to those 
processes. 
Second, the most standard and successful methods for resolving phylogenies, such as 
congruence testing based on parsimony or probabilistic analysis, work with sets of 
morphological and especially molecular characters (see, for example, Felsenstein, 2004). 
Characters that are useful for purposes of mapping phylogenies are easy to identify, evolve only 
once rather than repeatedly, and vary quasi-independently of other characters (Lewontin 1970; 
1974; Colless 1985). Processes are not very good characters in this sense. They are more 
difficult to identify and individuate as units of homology than the more clearly bounded 
morphological characters and genes. It has been pointed out, for example, that homology at the 
level of regulatory network structure is difficult to trace or resolve (Abouheif 1997, 1999), a 
problem exacerbated by the widespread presence of developmental system drift (Weiss and 
Fullerton 2000; True and Haag 2001; Haag, 2007; Haag and True 2018). Finally, it is not clear 
how much adding process characters into phylogenetic reconstructions would improve the 
quality of the resulting phylogenetic trees. 
Even if processes are not the most tractable characters for phylogenetic reconstruction, and 
may not be essential for arriving at congruent phylogenies, the main biological use for process 
homology lies elsewhere. Phylogenetic approaches to homology allow us to resolve 
evolutionary patterns, but do not address the underlying causal processes that generate them 
(Goodwin, 1982; Webster and Goodwin, 1996; Amundson, 2005; see also Jaeger and Monk, this 
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issue). However, such a causal understanding is ultimately required if we are interested in 
reconstructing the evolutionary origins and history of a specific character. Since ontogenetic 
processes generate phenotypic characters, they determine the probability of the evolutionary 
transitions a given character can undergo, thus influencing the relative probabilities of 
homoplasy and homology. 
Beyond the causal reconstruction of character phylogenies, process homology also has a more 
general role in explanations of evolutionary change. To explain how a lineage gets from one 
state to a later state—rather than merely describing the sequence of states—it is often not 
enough to rely on simple statistical models of genetic architecture and linear genotype-
phenotype mapping (DiFrisco and Jaeger 2019). Because the genotype-phenotype map is 
degenerate, and most traits are generated by nonlinear hierarchical regulatory processes, 
bridging the gap between genotype and phenotype calls for a causal understanding of complex 
dynamic mechanisms (DiFrisco and Jaeger 2019; DiFrisco and Jaeger 2020; DiFrisco et al. 
2020). 
Process homology has two roles in this context of mechanistic evolutionary research.[2] First, 
when changes in ontogeny are used to explain evolutionary changes, it is essential that these 
changes are placed in their actual historical sequence (Raff 1996). Obviously, an ontogenetic 
process can only explain some morphological trait if the two are historically contemporaneous. 
This requires establishing phylogenies (and thus homologies) of processes. Second, such 
explanations can potentially be generalized to different lineages through the notion of process 
homology. 
Explanations of how traits within a lineage transition from one state to another due to changes 
in the underlying ontogenetic mechanisms/processes are called lineage explanations (Calcott 
2009) (Fig. 1A). We call the generalization of a lineage explanation to a different lineage a cross-
lineage explanation (Fig. 1B). Cross-lineage explanations require the ability to trace both the 
focal trait and the ontogenetic process that produces it back along different branches of the 
phylogenetic tree to corresponding features in a common ancestor. 
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Fig. 1. Lineage and cross-lineage explanations. (A) Lineage explanations resolve how 
changes in ontogenetic mechanisms/processes cause phenotypic change within an 
evolutionary lineage. (B) Cross-lineage explanations generalize a lineage explanation 
to several evolutionary lineages, tracing both morphological characters and the 
ontogenetic processes that generate them back to the corresponding features in a 
common ancestor. 
In this paper, we aim to develop a conceptual model of process homology that is suitable for 
grounding cross-lineage explanations in the presence of widespread genetic co-option and 
developmental system drift. In Section 2, we illustrate the general problem using the examples 
of vertebrate somitogenesis and insect segmentation. Section 3 presents the core of the 
argument: we describe six complementary criteria for establishing homology between 
ontogenetic processes, illustrating each criterion with specific examples. We conclude the 
paper by discussing the relation of our account to other approaches to homology, and the 
broader evolutionary implications of our proposal. 
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2. The Homology of Animal Segmentation Processes 
Most difficulties with homology arise from the combined facts that it occurs at different levels 
of organization, and that evolution at different levels is dissociable to some degree. Three 
examples—all processes involved in animal body segmentation—demonstrate such 
evolutionary dissociation between levels. 
Our first example is somitogenesis, the process by which body segments are formed in 
vertebrates (Keynes and Stern, 1988; Pourquié, 2003; Dequéant and Pourquié, 2008; Oates et 
al., 2012; Hubaud and Pourquié, 2014; Oates, this issue; Clark, this issue) (Fig. 2A). Following 
the current literature on the subject, we define this process as involving the posterior growth 
of a tissue called the paraxial or presomitic mesoderm, and a regulatory network with three 
functionally distinguishable “dynamical modules”[3] (Jaeger and Monk, 2021; this issue): (1) a 
cell-autonomous oscillator (the “segmentation clock”), (2) cell-cell signaling between 
neighboring cells that maintains and/or synchronizes cell-autonomous oscillations across the 
tissue, and (3) a graded long-range modulation of the clock period (often called “the 
wavefront”[4]) causing it to slow down and eventually stop at some distance away from the 
posterior end of the tissue. The coordinated interaction of these dynamical modules results in 
periodic waves of gene expression traveling “up” the presomitic mesoderm towards the 
anterior, which results in transient blocks of mesodermal tissue forming sequentially along the 
antero-posterior axis of the embryo. These blocks are called somites (Keynes and Stern, 1988). 
Different sub-regions of the somites ultimately give rise to vertebrae, rib cage, skeletal muscle, 
as well as cartilage and dermis. Somites, as well as the activities of all three dynamical modules, 
are highly conserved across vertebrates, from fishes to birds to mammals (see, for example, 
Oates et al. 2012).  
 
Fig. 2. Animal body segmentation processes. (A) Vertebrate somitogenesis is the process that generates 
body segments (somites) through posterior growth of a tissue called the pre-somitic mesoderm during 
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axis elongation. This process involves three functionally distinguishable dynamical modules: (1) Cells 
within the pre-somitic mesoderm contain a cell-autonomous genetic oscillator (the “segmentation 
clock”). (2) Neighboring cells signal to each other to maintain and/or synchronize their oscillations. 
(3) Cellular oscillations slow down and eventually stop as cells leave the pre-somitic mesoderm 
anteriorly, constituting a determination front (the “wavefront”). This results in a stationary periodic 
spatial pattern of gene expression, which determines the morphological boundaries of the somites. 
(B) Short-germband (top) versus long-germband (bottom) segment determination in insects. Similar to 
somitogenesis, short-germband segment determination occurs through posterior tissue growth and a 
clock-and-wavefront mechanism, predominantly after gastrulation has occurred. In orthopteran insects, 
such as grasshoppers and crickets, for example, this leads to the sequential addition of segments as the 
embryo extends and grows posteriorly. In contrast, long-germband segmentation does not require tissue 
growth, and predominantly happens before gastrulation. In Drosophila melanogaster, for example, the 
embryo is subdivided by a hierarchical genetic cascade, initiated by gradients of maternal morphogens 
(not shown), which activate the zygotic gap, pair-rule, and segment-polarity genes. These genes form the 
distinct layers of the segmentation hierarchy; genes within each layer regulate each other and are 
regulated by layers above but not below them (with a few notable exceptions). Segment-polarity genes 
form a molecular pre-pattern that leads to the formation of morphological segments later in 
development. Both short- and long-germband segment determination result in a conserved segmented 
bauplan. See text for details. 
However, the underlying molecular and genetic mechanisms differ in many details. 
Segmentation clocks are all based on negative auto-regulation by members of the Hes/Her 
transcription factor family, but there seems to be some redundancy built into the oscillatory 
mechanism, and the identity of the hes/her paralogs involved differs between lineages (Oates, 
2012). Similarly, cell-cell signaling in the presomitic mesoderm is always based on the Notch-
Delta pathway, but different post-translational modifications of signaling components lead to 
different functional roles: in zebrafish, Notch-Delta signaling serves as an escapement 
mechanism that coordinates cell-autonomous oscillations, while in mice and chicks, it is 
required for the initiation and maintenance of the oscillations and alters their period (Oates, 
2020). In addition, there is surprisingly little overlap among the sets of genes that oscillate in 
different species, particularly in components of the Fgf and Wnt pathways, which suggests 
significant functional differences in the mechanisms that govern the gradual slow-down of 
expression waves (Krol et al. 2011). Finally, the oscillation period of the clock differs drastically 
between evolutionary lineages (Matsuda et al. 2020). 
In this example, there is enough phylogenetic evidence to establish homology between 
vertebrate somitogenesis processes without a detailed understanding of the underlying 
molecular and genetic mechanisms. However, such understanding is required for explaining the 
evolution of somitogenesis mechanisms, and to distinguish which aspects of this evolutionary 
process are adaptive, and which are due to neutral or compensatory developmental system 
drift (DiFrisco forthcoming). Because the molecular and genetic components of the underlying 
processes have diverged substantially in different lineages, a cross-lineage explanation for the 
evolutionary persistence of somites and somitogenesis as a process should include evidence at 
levels other than the molecular-genetic. In vertebrate somitogenesis, the “causality horizon” 
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(the lowest level at which the causes of the same phenotypic feature are conserved) lies at the 
relatively high level of the dynamics of the process rather than the lower level of the underlying 
detailed molecular-genetic interactions (Salazar-Ciudad and Jernvall 2013; DiFrisco and Jaeger 
2019; Oates 2020). Thus, we should not only ask what aspects of the mechanism are conserved, 
but also what aspects of the activity of the system are conserved (and which ones are not). 
Stabilizing or positive selection can act on different aspects of the oscillatory dynamics 
(oscillatory period, for example). Also relevant to understanding the conservation of the 
process are entrenched inter-dependencies between somites, somitogenesis, and other 
characters and processes, such as axis elongation and tissue maturation (Riedl, 1978; Wimsatt, 
1986; Oates, 2020).  
Our second and third examples concern invertebrate body segmentation. Insects exhibit a highly 
conserved bauplan, with stereotypical numbers and arrangements of head, thoracic, and 
abdominal segments (Grimaldi & Engel, 2005). However, different orders of insects use what 
appear to be wildly divergent modes of segment determination to specify the position of their 
body segments (Sander, 1976; Tautz and Sommer, 1995; Davis and Patel, 2002; Rosenberg et 
al., 2009; Clark et al., 2019) (Fig. 2B). 
These divergent modes of segment determination can be arranged along a spectrum with many 
intermediate forms. At one end of this spectrum lies what is thought to be the ancestral mode 
of segment determination. It occurs in lineages with short-germband embryos (reviewed in 
Sander, 1976). These insects form their body segments sequentially, mostly after gastrulation 
occurs, through tissue extension and growth at the posterior end of the embryonic anlage. 
Paradigmatic examples of short-germband insects are crickets and grasshoppers (Orthoptera). 
The process of segment determination in short-germband insects is strikingly similar (although 
not homologous) to the process of somitogenesis, involving equivalent clock-and-wavefront 
dynamics[5] (Sarrazin et al., 2012; El-Sherif et al., 2014), as well as a three-tiered dynamic 
modularity with a cell-autonomous clock, cell-cell synchronization, and expression changes at 
a longer time scale that cause the slowing-down of the clock in the anterior part of the segment-
addition zone (Clark et al., 2019) (Fig. 2B). 
At the other extreme of the spectrum, long-germband insects determine their segments 
(almost) simultaneously, by subdividing their bodies into distinct regions of gene expression 
during early embryogenesis, predominantly before the onset of gastrulation (Fig. 2B). No tissue 
growth is required for this process. Long-germband segment determination only occurs in 
holometabolous insects.[6] Examples include bees and wasps (Hymenoptera), some beetle 
species (Coleoptera), as well as flies, midges, and mosquitoes (Diptera). Many intermediate 
forms exist—in true bugs (Hemiptera), or certain beetle species, for example—where anterior 
segments form simultaneously, while posterior ones form sequentially (Chipman and 
Edgecombe, 2019; Clark et al., 2019). 
9 
In this example, it is ostensibly only the outcome of the process—an embryonic stage called the 
segmented germband—that is highly conserved (Sander, 1976), while the overall dynamics and 
many of the genes involved in the segment-determination process (especially maternal 
activators and gap genes) differ between insect lineages (Auman & Chipman, 2017; Clark et al. 
2019). This would initially suggest that the two modes of segmentation are non-homologous, 
but the answer depends on the phylogenetic scope of comparison (Patterson 1982). On the one 
hand, long-germband segmentation only occurs within the superorder of the Holometabola, and 
could be considered an evolutionary novelty compared to segment determination modes 
outside this clade. At this scale, it is not homologous to short-germband segment determination. 
On the other hand, long-germband segment determination clearly derives from a short-
germband process in the common ancestor of all insects (Sander, 1976; Davis and Patel, 2002; 
Clark et al. 2019). Thus, across the entire class of Insecta, long- and short-germband segment 
determination must be considered transformational homologues of the same ancestral 
segmentation process. Because the dynamics have significantly diverged between the two 
modes of segment determination, a lineage explanation is needed for establishing a plausible 
transformation sequence between them—and thus homology. Since the transformation from 
short- to long-germband modes has occurred multiple times independently in different 
holometabolous lineages (Davis and Patel, 2002; Clark et al. 2019), such a lineage explanation 
can be generalized into a cross-lineage explanation (we will revisit this point in Section 3.6). 
Our third example concerns segment determination within a much narrower phylogenetic 
range of insects: different lineages of cyclorrhaphan flies[7] (Grimaldi and Engel, 2005; 
Wiegmann et al. 2011). These flies all exhibit some form of long-germband segment 
determination. In this phylogenetic context, not only are the general dynamics and the outcome 
of the process highly conserved, but also the qualitative structure of the underlying genetic 
mechanism. Despite such high conservation down to the genetic level, it is surprising that the 
molecular details of gene regulation still differ considerably: the sequences of cis-regulatory 
elements that govern the expression of segmentation genes show very little conservation even 
across closely related dipteran species (see, for example, Hare et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2009). The 
underlying sequence changes are mostly neutral or affect the strength of specific regulatory 
interactions, while the overall qualitative topology of the network remains unchanged (Wotton 
et al. 2015; Crombach et al. 2016). 
Our three examples of process homology are summarized in Table 1. Segment determination in 
cyclorrhaphan flies is conserved at the level of the outcome (the segmented germband), the 
dynamics or activity of the process, the nature of the underlying genetic interactions, but not at 
the molecular level of regulatory sequences. Vertebrate somitogenesis is conserved at the level 
of the outcome (somites), the overall dynamics or activity of the process, but only partially at 
the level of the underlying genetic interactions. Little is known about the molecular 
mechanisms at the level of regulatory sequence in this case. Segment determination across 
different orders of insects shows conservation of outcome (the segmented germband), but not 
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at the level of dynamics/activity (short- vs. long-germband segmentation), while there is partial 
conservation of the underlying genetic and molecular mechanisms. 
In addition to the above, we need to mention examples of gene regulatory network co-option 
(True and Carroll, 2002; Peter and Davidson, 2015; Shubin et al., 2009; Monteiro, 2012, 
McQueen and Rebeiz, 2020). Such co-option events are thought to underlie the evolutionary 
origin of beetle horns and butterfly wing spots, which are both based on a developmental 
process originally involved in insect limb formation (Monteiro and Podlaha, 2009; Moczek et 
al., 2009; Monteiro, 2015). Similarly, the conserved regulatory network responsible for adult 
skeletogenesis across echinoderms got recruited into embryonic development in sea urchins, 
where it is responsible for generating the larval skeleton of the pluteus larva, which only occurs 
in this particular lineage (Hinman et al. 2003; Olivieri et al. 2008; Gao et al. 2008). In both of 
these cases, the morphological outcome of the process is clearly not homologous to the original 
trait whose underlying network was co-opted[8], but there is homology at the level of process 
dynamics as well as genetic and molecular components (see Table 1, and also section 3.2). 
Conservation/homo










Phenotypic outcome yes yes yes no 
Ontogenetic process yes yes or no* yes yes 
Genetic network partial partial yes yes 
Individual genes partial partial partial yes 
Sequence level unknown no no unknown 
* Depending on phylogenetic scope (see text). 
Table 1: Summary of examples. Ontogenetic processes represent a distinctive level of organization 
(highlighted in gray). The distinctive pattern of conservation across these examples indicates that 
evolution at this “process” level is (at least partially) dissociable from evolution at other levels, and is 
thus amenable to classification in terms of process homology. 
What do these examples tell us about the requirements for an account of process homology? 
One immediate conclusion we can draw, even from such a preliminary and limited sample of 
examples, is that evolution is dissociable at different levels of organization. If we include the 
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examples of network co-option—which do not have a conserved outcome—it is evident that 
none of the levels depicted in Table 1 show a consistent pattern of conservation across all 
examples. In fact, we can think of no good example where the homology of a complex generative 
process is fully conserved at all levels of organization across a significant phylogenetic distance. 
It seems that some amount of network drift and dissociability are the norm in evolution. 
Therefore, an account of process homology must be consistent with these phenomena: we need 
criteria of homology for each level that is dissociable from other levels, and cannot simply 
collapse the sub-morphological levels down to genetic homology. 
This points to a major limitation of the earlier account of process homology provided by Scott 
Gilbert and Jessica Bolker (Gilbert et al., 1996; Gilbert and Bolker, 2001). According to these 
authors, “the homology of process” is "the relationship between pathways that are composed 
of homologous proteins” (Gilbert and Bolker, 2001, 3). Their account relies on conserved 
structural properties of the underlying genetic signatures as its only criterion for homology. 
Accordingly, Gilbert and Bolker (2001) use conserved intercellular signaling pathways—such 
as the Wnt pathway—as their primary examples of process homologs. For this reason, we refer 
to their account as “pathway homology.” Pathway homology ends up collapsing homology of 
process onto the genetic level. It is only applicable to processes in which the underlying genetic 
components are conserved, but not to those that are affected by developmental system drift, 
where pathway components have been exchanged during the course of evolution. Furthermore, 
it is not able to deal with transformational homologies, such as the different modes of insect 
segment determination, where the dynamics of the process have evolved as well. This means 
that the pathway approach will miss many true cases of process homology (Table 1). The 
following section presents criteria for recognizing process homology that are consistent with 
the evolutionary dissociability of levels. 
 
3. Homology of Processes 
To develop an understanding of how ontogenetic processes can stand in relations of homology, 
we focus on relatively well-defined examples like somitogenesis and segmentation and attempt 
to reach more general insights in a bottom-up fashion. However, it may be unavoidable to 
consider more general questions about biological processes from the start. Specifically, one 
might worry that it is necessary to know how to demarcate processes in general prior to 
assessing their homology. Whether or not two characters are homologous is sensitive to the 
way we draw boundaries around them, and this is clearly true of ontogenetic processes as well. 
Does a model of process homology therefore need to provide a background “ontology” of 
processes, then? 
To address this issue, consider that biologists successfully establish homologies without having 
a clear definition or theory of “characters,” even though homology relations depend on the 
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identification of characters. This is possible because context-specific information about the 
particular characters at issue does part of the work of demarcation. It is also because the 
dependence is not one-way: character identification and homology assessment have a mutually 
revising, iterative relationship. For example, whether bat wings and the forefins of a given 
teleost are homologous certainly depends on how we define “wings” and “fins,” but the 
phylogeny of these characters also tells us that any such homology would be at the very coarse 
level of osteichthyan paired appendages, which does not include tetrapod skeletal articulations 
such as the stylopod, zeugopod, and autopod. Success in applying the criteria of homology 
shows that the characters are well-defined enough that the process of assessing homology and 
revising character boundaries can get off the ground without requiring a foundationalist basis 
(DiFrisco 2021). This is the approach we take to the demarcation of processes here—namely, 
to allow the applicability of the proposed criteria of process homology to distinguish the 
processes that are well-defined enough to be homologized from those that are not. A more 
general ontology of biological processes would, like a theory of characters, be a helpful addition 
to this project but is not a necessary precondition for it (for some existing resources, see Dupré 
2017; Nicholson and Dupré 2018; Seibt 2020; DiFrisco 2021). 
It is also important to note the limits of criteria for recognizing and inferring homology. 
Phylogenetic relations of homology can never be fixed with absolute certainty because the 
evidence used to infer them is based on finite and open-ended empirical research. As a 
consequence, homology judgments are always hypotheses. They may be more or less well-
confirmed in different cases, but they are always revisable in light of new evidence. Given also 
that the sources of evidence for establishing homology are diverse and sometimes indirect, 
there is not going to be a simple and informative definition of process homology beyond the 
generic phylogenetic one (homology as sameness due to derivation from a shared common 
ancestor). Instead, establishing homology between processes will involve multiple evidential 
criteria, which together are indicative of phylogeny, but none of which is necessary or sufficient 
for homology. 
We propose that the evidential criteria for process homology include the following: 
1. sameness of the parts or components involved in a process, 
2. sameness of the phenotypic outcome, 
3. sameness of topological position, 
4. sameness of dynamical properties, 
5. dynamical complexity, and 
6. evidence of transitional forms of the process. 
Several of these (1–3) are also criteria of homology for “character identity mechanisms” 
(DiFrisco et al. 2020). Criteria 3–6 are loosely based on established criteria of homology for 
morphological characters (Remane, 1952), but are adapted specifically for the tools of 
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dynamical modeling, which is where our main contribution lies. The main results of this 
discussion are summarized in Table 2 at the end of this section. 
3.1 Parts 
Ontogenetic processes are causal activities that are performed by parts or components, such as 
genes, proteins, cells, and tissues. The parts that are causally involved in a process constitute 
its participant structure (Seibt, 2004). Somitogenesis, for example, has a complicated 
participant structure that includes cyclic oscillatory genes such as Hes/Her-family transcription 
factors, the signaling molecules and receptors in the Delta-Notch pathway, Notch signaling-
modulator Lunatic fringe (Lfng), and tissue-level components such as the cells of the presomitic 
mesoderm (Oates et al., 2012; Oates, 2020). Although the overall dynamics and the outcome of 
the process are conserved across vertebrates, the participant structure of somitogenesis has 
diverged significantly between different lineages (Krol et al., 2011, Oates, 2020) (see Table 1, 
Section 2). This example shows how having the same parts is a useful but fallible guide to 
homology of the overlying ontogenetic process. A good default assumption is that the 
participant structure of a process will be highly conserved in recently diverged lineages, but 
this conservation will tend to degrade with increasing phylogenetic distance even if the process 
stays the same. 
One reason why somitogenesis can be traced and homologized quasi-independently of 
underlying gene homologies is that it is a complex process involving the interaction between 
numerous parts, many of which are functionally redundant and replaceable in evolution. This 
points to a distinction between two kinds of processes that is important for assessing homology 
(see DiFrisco et al., 2020, for more detail). A simple process is an activity or behavior of a single 
unified entity. A complex process like somitogenesis or segmentation, in contrast, is the result 
of interactions between multiple entities, without there being a unified entity that co-varies 
with the process on the same spatiotemporal scales. Complex processes include expression 
dynamics of gene regulatory networks, tissue morphogenesis based on cell movements, and 
excitation dynamics in neural networks. Simple processes include the DNA-binding activity of 
a transcription factor, the migration of individual cells, and behaviors of whole organisms (such 
as locomotion). The distinction between complex and simple is not absolute but is partly 
relative to a level of organization and grain of description. Complex processes can be 
decomposed into multiple simple processes whose integration often introduces nonlinear 
emergent dynamics. In turn, simple activities such as transcription factor binding can be further 
decomposed into a biochemically complex process, involving interactions of multiple molecular 
parts. 
The relevance of this distinction comes from the fact that a trait must possess evolutionary 
individuality in order to stand in homology relations: it must be traceable across generations 
and lineages, and should be capable of varying quasi-independently of other traits. A simple 
activity is unlikely to have a meaningful degree of quasi-independence from the entity that 
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performs it. As a result, simple activities are less interesting processes to homologize for 
comparative developmental biology, and can be traced (if desired) in terms of the homology of 
the performing entity (gene, cell type, etc.). Complex activities, by contrast, often do possess 
quasi-independence from the interacting entities involved (DiFrisco et al., 2020). Many 
ontogenetic processes are robust to perturbations in their participant structure and evolve with 
high functional redundancy among genetic components (Payne and Wagner, 2019). This makes 
complex processes more interesting to trace in comparative biology, but also makes their 
homology more challenging to assess. 
3.2 Phenotypic outcome 
As with the parts involved in a process, sameness of the outcome, product, or end state of two 
processes is indicative of their homology. If the outcome of a process is a morphological trait—
including cell types, tissues, and organs—sameness of outcome can be established using 
existing criteria of morphological homology. Our examples of somitogenesis and segmentation 
both involve conserved morphological characters (somites, segments) that provide evidence 
for the homology of the ontogenetic processes that generate them. 
As is the case for all the other criteria, homology of morphological outcome should not be 
viewed as necessary for homology of process. The main reason is that processes (just like gene 
networks) can be co-opted into novel developmental roles (see section 2). Larval 
skeletogenesis in sea urchins provides an excellent example: although the developmental 
context of the process differs radically, the intrinsic activity of building a skeleton remains 
remarkably similar in larvae and adults (Hinman et al., 2003, Olivieri et al., 2008, Gao et al., 
2008). If processes were only identified by their role or outcome, the undesirable result would 
follow that any co-opted process ceases to be homologous to the same process before co-option. 
This threatens to make co-option a meaningless biological category. A better alternative is to 
hold that sameness of outcome is a defeasible (potentially violable) criterion of homology, 
which no longer applies when homologous processes are re-deployed for different functions. 
When this happens, one should rely on other criteria to identify homologies between 
ontogenetic processes. 
This discussion highlights that phenotypic outcomes and ontogenetic roles are closely 
associated with the notion of biological function. For instance, it is the function of skeletogenesis 
to produce a skeleton (larval or adult). Function, however, is a factor that is supposed to have 
no bearing on homology. According to Owen’s classical definition, homologues are the same 
“under every variety of form and function” (Owen 1843). For instance, the ontogenetic processes 
generating insect appendages and beetle horns or butterfly wing spots can be homologous 
without serving the same function (Monteiro and Podlaha, 2009; Moczek et al., 2009; Monteiro, 
2015). A similar example is provided by the life cycle of cnidarians, which often involves a 
process of metagenesis called strobilation, during which a series of medusae segment and 
detach from a sessile polyp. In cubozoans, however, this metagenetic process has been 
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transformed into a form of metamorphosis, as each polyp only produces one medusa (Collins, 
2002). Here, homologous processes play different roles, and thus fulfill different functions, as 
part of the life cycle (DiFrisco 2019). The problems related to mixing homology judgments with 
considerations of function or outcomes only arise if homologous processes cannot be identified 
independently of their outcome. Our examples illustrate that this is not the case. 
A different question concerns whether processes themselves are functions (as opposed to 
having functions). If this is the case, then processes would seem to be inappropriate candidates 
to stand in relations of homology. The assumption that processes are functions and are 
therefore not homologizable has been a long-standing source of confusion (see Gilbert and 
Bolker, 2001; Love, 2007, for further discussion). On this point, we note that there are multiple 
notions of “function,” most of which are not synonymous with “process” as we use the term (see 
Wouters, 2003; Griesemer, 2006; Love, 2007; Brigandt, 2017; DiFrisco et al., 2020). The key 
distinction is between “function” understood as something external to the process—its 
adaptive effect, ontogenetic role, or phenotypic outcome—versus “function” understood as the 
process itself—its inherent operation, activity, or “functioning.” It is the former kind of extrinsic 
function that was excluded by Owen’s classic definition of homology. Yet, as others have argued 
(especially Love, 2007; Brigandt, 2017), there is no reason to prohibit homologizing the latter 
kind of functions as long as it is fruitful to do so. Whether these are called “functions,” “activity-
functions,” or simply “processes” (as we call them) does not matter. What matters is that they 
can be identified not only by their outcomes or developmental roles but by their intrinsic 
characteristics. We will show how this is done in section 3.4. 
3.3 Topological position 
Perhaps the most important criterion of homology before the arrival of evolutionary theory was 
the topological position of a character relative to other characters in the organism. Early 
comparative anatomists such as Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Owen noticed that the topology of 
the character was more invariant across diverse taxonomic groups than properties like size, 
shape, form, and use-function, and that it could be successfully used as a basis for establishing 
classifications of characters such as elements of the vertebrate skeleton (Panchen, 1994). This 
criterion has generally been preserved as homology was applied to characters at other levels of 
organization. Genes, for example, are homologized based on sequence similarity as well as 
location—the relative position of nucleotides within the gene, and the gene’s syntenic location 
on chromosomes (Fitch, 1970; Patterson, 1988). 
Many of the ontogenetic processes that can be homologized are active in restricted regions of 
the organism and exhibit specific spatiotemporal relations to other processes. Having the same 
topological position relative to other processes is evidence that two ontogenetic processes are 
homologous. Temporal position in ontogenetic sequences is also a useful criterion and is 
essential for establishing the identity of developmental stages in particular (Scholtz, 2005). 
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Stage identity informs the way that re-arrangements of stages—such as pedomorphosis and 
other forms of heterochrony—are classified in comparative research. 
Like sameness of phenotypic outcome, sameness of topological position in space and time is 
defeasible, and can be violated by heterochrony as well as heterotopy, which occur when there 
is co-option and redeployment of ontogenetic processes for different developmental roles. For 
example, segment determination and gastrulation are related in very different ways in long- 
and short-germband insects. While the former determine most or all body segments before the 
onset of gastrulation, the latter do so mostly after gastrulation has occurred (see, for example, 
Sander, 1976; Davis and Patel, 2002; Clark et al. 2019). Therefore, segment determination has 
been heterochronically shifted to an earlier developmental stage in long-germband insects, a 
fact which will become important when (re)considering the homology of the process in section 
3.6. Similarly, larval skeletogenesis in sea urchins occurs at an earlier stage and in a different 
developmental context than adult skeletogenesis (Hinman et al., 2003). Nevertheless, the two 
processes are clearly homologous. In such cases of co-option, again, one must rely on other 
criteria of homology.[9] 
3.4 Dynamical properties 
An important consequence of the limitations of the previous three criteria is that homology of 
process must, at least in part, be based on intrinsic characteristics of the processes or activities 
themselves. We call these characteristics “dynamical properties.” The activities of most 
ontogenetic processes can be identified and described as regular sequences of changes—for 
example, the distinctive sequence of gene expression changes and tissue movements that occur 
during gastrulation or neurulation. This initial characterization tends to be followed by 
experimental investigations of the regulatory mechanisms that account for the orderliness of 
these sequences. Homology for such processes can be established by applying the traditional 
morphological similarity criteria not only to end states (e.g., the neural tube) but to the entire 
sequence of changes leading to those end states (neurulation) (see Havstad et al. 2015). When 
the underlying mechanisms guiding such changes are identified, this may further inform and 
corroborate judgments of homology for the overlying phenotypic processes. 
However, in many cases it is impossible to identify dynamic mechanisms by observation and 
experiment alone, because complex ontogenetic processes involve nonlinear interactions of 
many different parts across multiple levels of organization. This is why dynamical systems 
modeling is required to understand and trace the orchestrated overall activities of such 
processes (Jaeger et al., 2012; Jaeger and Sharpe; 2014, Jaeger and Monk, 2014; DiFrisco and 
Jaeger, 2019, 2020). In addition, dynamical systems theory reveals a whole range of further 
dynamic properties that can be used for the classification and characterization of processes, 
going beyond simple sequences of changes and qualitative regulatory interactions. 
A dynamical model of an ontogenetic process formalizes its regulatory structure as a set of 
(differential) equations.[10] These equations describe the underlying rules that govern the 
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observed patterns of change in state variables such as concentrations of metabolites, proteins, 
or signaling molecules, cell number, shape, or size, membrane potentials, or factors such as pH 
which affect the intracellular milieu. They represent the time-evolution of an ontogenetic 
process along a trajectory from an initial state to an end state in phase space (sometimes also 
called state space), an abstract mathematical construct whose dimensions are given by the state 
variables and whose points consist of specific states of the system (Fig. 3, top). The sum total of 
all trajectories in a phase space defines the phase portrait. Points at which trajectories end (and 
the state of the system no longer changes) are known as steady states. Some states in the phase 
portrait are more stable than others. These stable states or regions of a phase portrait are 
known as attractors, where trajectories from many initial states converge on a point or on a 
trajectory (cyclical or aperiodic) located in a restricted sub-volume of phase space. The subset 
of trajectories that converge on a particular attractor are called its basin of attraction (Fig. 3, 
top left). The number, type, and relative position of these attractors and their basins with regard 
to each other define the topology of a phase space, which in turn determines the repertoire of 
dynamical behaviors a system can generate starting from a given range of initial states (Jaeger 




Fig. 3. Concepts of dynamical systems theory. Top: the phase or state space of a 
system is defined by its state variables (v1 and v2). The totality of trajectories in 
this space define the phase portrait of the system. Examples of bistable and 
monostable phase portraits are shown, in which trajectories (indicated by arrows) 
converge towards two attractors or one attractor (indicated by circles), 
respectively. The bistable phase portrait also has a saddle point (diamond), which 
lies on a separatrix that forms the border between its two basins of attraction. 
Bottom: the parameter space of a system is defined by its parameters (p1 and p2). 
Bifurcation boundaries separate bistable and monostable dynamical regimes. 
Middle: phase and parameter space together form the configuration space of the 
system. The steady-state value of one of the variables (v1) is shown as a folded 
sheet. The fold and its cusp within the sheet represent the bifurcation boundaries. 
Steady states in the phase portraits map onto specific cross-sections of 
configuration space (as indicated by vertical lines). Steady states that map onto the 
upper surface of the folded sheet are attractors, steady states that map onto folds 
of the sheet are saddle points. See text for details. 
Dynamical systems models are not only defined by their state variables, but also by their 
parameters, which describe aspects such as rates of production, diffusion, and decay for 
molecular components, rates of cell division at the tissue level, or the level of random 
fluctuations a regulatory process is exposed to. A special set of parameters, called the boundary 
conditions of the system, delimit the spatio-temporal domain across which a process is active. 
Like the state variables, the parameters of a process can change during ontogenesis and/or 
evolution (e.g., Verd et al., 2014). For instance, the shape and size of the spatial domain of the 
system can change through tissue rearrangements or growth, diffusion rates can be altered 
through changes in the extracellular matrix or through the cellularization of a tissue, or the 
structure of a gene regulatory network itself can be modified by environmental influences and 
mutational processes. The parameters of the system define the dimensions of its parameter 
space, whose points consist of specific phase portraits of the system (Fig. 3, bottom). Parameter 
values typically change over a longer time scale than variables, but the separation between the 
two is somewhat arbitrary and highly problem-dependent. Changing the parameters of a 
system renders its structure time-variable, and changes its dynamical repertoire. Attractors are 
created, altered, and annihilated through bifurcations, which transform the topology of the 
phase portrait when the system crosses a bifurcation boundary in parameter space. The 
configuration space of a system combines its phase and parameter space (Fig. 3, middle). Each 
point in this abstract space represents a specific set of state variables and parameters (a specific 
system configuration). The topology of configuration space consists of the phase space 
topologies within it, plus the bifurcation boundaries and the dynamical regimes they separate 
(Fig. 3). 
Thom (1975) established that complex morphogenetic processes can be rigorously and 
systematically classified based on the topological properties of their configuration spaces. The 
core idea is to define equivalence classes for configuration space topologies that correspond to 
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the same kinds of processes. One such class, the cusp-and-fold, is shown in Fig. 3. We extend his 
framework by noting that the geometrical arrangement of sets of attractors and their 
bifurcations (which Thom called “catastrophes”)—not only defines their dynamical properties, 
but also their evolutionary potential. The dynamical properties systematically capture the 
intrinsic characteristics of a process: the state variables, their functional interdependencies, 
and the temporal sequence of states that follows from a given range of system configurations. 
These properties contain much more information than either the outcome, which corresponds 
to end states only, or the structural description of the components involved in the process. The 
evolutionary potential of a process, in turn, is described in the model by the way dynamical 
properties can change and generate different phenotypic transitions with different 
probabilities. Thus, for example, a dynamical model of a process can illuminate how a process 
can remain the same despite changing components and interactions. Furthermore, the topology 
of configuration space indicates whether the dynamics of a process are sensitive to changes in 
its configuration. If a system is resilient to a certain type of such changes, it can be said to be 
structurally stable with regard to the affected variables and parameters (Thom, 1975).[11] 
Structural stability is a formal measure for the robustness of the process. Replacement of parts 
or changes in the number or kind of interactions are less likely to lead to qualitative differences 
in overall activity to the extent that a system is structurally stable. Because models can capture 
not only the dynamical regime of an ontogenetic process but also its stability, they can 
significantly contribute to explaining the persistence of a process through developmental 
system drift, both qualitative and quantitative (see, for example, Crombach et al. 2016). 
If two ontogenetic processes can be placed in equivalence classes of configuration space 
topologies, according to empirically-validated dynamical models, this is strong evidence of their 
homology. Belonging to such classes is what it means for processes to have the “same 
dynamics,” from within the formalism of dynamical systems theory. Of course, this criterion—
shared dynamical properties, for short—must be combined with the other criteria in assessing 
homology. 
An important way in which this dynamical perspective differs from other criteria of homology 
is that it is not restricted to the properties of a system or character that are actually realized. 
The states and parameters represented by points in configuration space may be actual 
configurations of real systems, or possible configurations that are accessible to those systems 
via changes in parameters or initial states. This provides a powerful exploratory tool to study 
the space of possible dynamical properties of ontogenetic processes and their equivalence 
relations, which goes far beyond the reach of experimental studies. We will revisit this 
important issue in section 3.6 and the Conclusions. 
3.5 Dynamical complexity 
The trouble with similarity-based criteria of homology, including shared dynamical properties, 
is that similarity can arise from convergent evolution rather than common descent. It is for this 
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reason that Remane (1952) refined the generic criterion of similarity to similarity in “special 
quality”—structural details of a character not explained by its adaptive role. The more complex 
those structural details are, the less likely they are to be products of convergent evolution (see 
Riedl, 1978). In a phylogenetic framework, the complexity of a character is proportional to the 
number of sub-characters it contains, under the assumption that each distinct sub-character 
constitutes an independent piece of evidence of phylogeny. 
Similar considerations apply when the character under consideration is an ontogenetic process. 
The complexity of a process, as represented in a dynamical model, is proportional to the 
following factors:[12] 
1. complexity of morphological outcome (assessed by morphological criteria—e.g., 
number and diversity of sub-characters, such as cell types and tissues), 
2. number of variables and parameters (the dimensionality of configuration space), 
3. topological complexity of configuration space—i.e., number and diversity of types of 
attractors and bifurcations, 
4. number and diversity of types of parts involved, 
5. number and diversity of types of dynamical modules (see below). 
For two processes under comparison, having shared dynamical properties carries more 
phylogenetic signal to the extent that those processes are complex, as determined by factors 1–
5. Evaluating these factors requires a more advanced understanding of the process than criteria 
like topological position, so considerations of complexity are more appropriate to later stages 
of comparative research, such as providing plausible transformation sequences through cross-
lineage explanations (see section 3.6). 
Dynamical modules (factor 5) are causally distinct sub-processes or activities within a larger 
process, analogous to sub-characters within a morphological character (e.g., phalanges within 
the autopod) (Jaeger and Monk, 2021; this issue). Like structural parts, processes can be 
“modular” in the sense that sub-processes exhibit some autonomy relative to the rest of the 
system combined with some kind of internal causal cohesion. For example, the Hes/Her-driven 
oscillations that occur during somitogenesis are cell-autonomous behaviors: cells isolated from 
the presomitic mesoderm continue to oscillate for a while without Delta-Notch synchronization 
and the wavefront mechanism, though the oscillation is unstable and has a longer period 
(Masamizu et al., 2006; Webb et al., 2016; Hubaud et al., 2017; Oates, 2020). These oscillators 
(the “segmentation clock”) constitute one of three dynamical modules in the somitogenesis 
process, along with Delta-Notch signaling and the wavefront modulation of the clock (as 
introduced in section 2). Because these three modules are causally dissociable to some degree, 
their joint presence in different vertebrate lineages adds extra evidence to the hypothesis that 
somitogenesis is homologous across vertebrates. 
Since dynamical modules are activities that make up a coherent overlying process, we can think 
of processes as occupying higher or lower levels of organization (see Brooks et al., 2021; and 
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also Brigandt, 2017). Often, these dynamical levels roughly correspond to the compositional 
levels of parts or components of a process. For instance, complex transcriptional processes can 
frequently be subdivided into dynamical modules that occur at the level of the underlying gene 
regulatory network. An example is provided by the segmentation gene system of dipteran 
insects, which can be subdivided into maternal, gap, pair-rule, and segment-polarity sub-
networks, each generating a characteristic type of gene expression pattern (see Fig. 2B in 
section 2). 
However, dynamical and compositional levels can come apart when the participants in a 
dynamical module lack structural modularity, or when the same parts are involved in multiple 
processes. For example, the gap gene network generates multi-stable (switch-like) expression 
dynamics in the anterior, and (damped) oscillatory expression dynamics in the posterior of the 
embryo (Jaeger et al., 2004; Manu et al., 2009; Verd et al., 2017, 2018). These different 
dynamical regimes can be mapped onto different subsets of genes and interactions within the 
network, but these subsets show extensive overlap in composition with regard to each other  
(Verd et al. 2019; reviewed in Jaeger, 2018). Moreover, there is a sub-network that is active in 
the middle of the embryo, which generates both switch-like and oscillatory behaviors. Clearly, 
there is no simple mapping between activity and structure here. In such cases, dynamical 
modularity can be used to identify modules of parts—a “decomposition under a process”—in a 
way that reveals a non-trivial correspondence of dynamical and compositional levels (DiFrisco 
2021; see also Jaeger and Monk, 2021 and this issue). Like statistically-derived variational 
modules (Wagner and Altenberg, 1996; Wagner, 2007; Melo et al., 2016), dynamical modules 
and levels can be viewed as comprising quasi-independent units of developmental evolution. 
3.6 Transitional forms in configuration space 
Characters do not have to be complex to be homologous, but they also do not even need to be 
similar. Well-known examples of dissimilar homologues include the transformation of the jaw 
joint of reptiles into inner ear ossicles of mammals, and the transformation of the parietal eye 
in lower vertebrates to the mammalian pineal gland. The existence of transitional forms is part 
of the reason these characters can be recognized as homologous despite their dissimilarity. 
According to Remane (1952), two characters that cannot be homologized using the criteria of 
topological position and special quality can still be homologous if they can be connected in a 
transformation series in which each adjacent character can be homologized using those criteria 
(Griffiths 2007; cf. Hennig 1966, 93). The same considerations apply to homology between 
ontogenetic processes. 
Unfortunately, our capacity to construct transformation series using actual transitional forms 
will always be limited, especially in the case of ontogenetic processes, which are incredibly 
difficult to reconstruct from evidence in the fossil record. This capacity is significantly enhanced 
by the use of dynamical models that provide hypothetical or inferred transformations based on 
a reconstruction of the space of possible variations for a given actual process (Alberch, 1991; 
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Jaeger & Monk, 2014; see also McGhee, 2007). As we have seen, ontogenetic processes that 
actually occur in an organism can be represented as specific trajectories within a phase portrait, 
or in the larger context of a configuration space (Fig. 3). On top of this, the configuration space 
of a dynamical model includes the set of all possible trajectories for a process across a given 
range of configurations, not only the ones that are presently actualized (see section 3.4). 
Accordingly, transitional forms may correspond to possible but yet-unrealized trajectories that 
lie between actual trajectories in configuration space. If our hypothesis is right that homologies 
of process map to equivalence classes of configuration space topologies, which are structurally 
stable with regard to certain changes in values of state variables and parameters, then it follows 
that any realistic transformation series must correspond to realizable evolutionary trajectories 
through configuration space. 
Configuration space provides a probabilistic “map of the possible” for how the causal structure 
of an ontogenetic process might change under various kinds of perturbations, even when 
counterfactual states are not directly accessible experimentally or observationally. Such a “map 
of the possible” reveals how probable (or improbable) it is for a given transition to happen in 
evolution. Some dramatic phenotypic changes may turn out to reflect rather subtle tweaking of 
the configuration of the system. Insect segmentation, once again, provides an example. The 
processes of short- and long-germband segment determination differ considerably in their 
components, dynamic properties, and topological relations (see Fig. 2B and Table 1 in section 
2). However, it takes surprisingly few and subtle mutations and fate map changes to convert 
one into the other (cf. Clark, 2017; Benton, 2018; Verd et al. 2018, 2019; Clark et al. 2019).  
We have seen in section 3.5 how a sub-network of the gap gene system can generate both 
switch-like and damped oscillatory behaviors observed in long-germband segmentation. An 
analysis of its configuration space reveals that the damped oscillatory regime in turn lies in the 
vicinity of sustained oscillations typical for short-germband segmentation. In other words, 
short- and long-germband segmentation are much closer together on the map of the possible 
than previously thought, which makes transitions between them much more probable (Verd et 
al., 2019). Another consequence of the damped oscillatory regime is that it is required for 
proper positioning of shifting pair-rule stripes in the posterior of the embryo (Clark, 2017). In 
contrast to the gap network, the role of pair-rule genes in segmentation is highly conserved 
across insects (Clark et al., 2019). When comparing their expression dynamics between long- 
and short-germband embryos, a previously undiscovered similarity between the two modes of 
segment determination becomes apparent (Clark & Peel, 2018): pair-rule genes undergo a 
dynamic transition in their regulatory regime in the segment-addition zone during sequential 
segmentation, leading to the stabilization of expression waves. This transition also occurs in 
long-germband insects, albeit before gastrulation and simultaneously along the entire length of 
the embryo. Once reassessed in terms of their dynamic regimes, both long- and short-germband 
segmentation processes become simple spatiotemporal transformations of each other, rather 
than being separated by a seemingly unbridgeable evolutionary gap (Clark et al., 2019). 
23 
Transitions between the modes of segmentation are revealed to be much more probable than 
expected, which is evidence of their transformational homology. 
Similar modeling analyses uncovering surprising equivalences between seemingly diverse 
patterning processes have been performed for the evolution of mammalian teeth (Salazar-
Ciudad and Jernvall, 2002, 2010; Salazar-Ciudad and Marín-Riera, 2013) and the  fin-to-limb 
transition in vertebrate evolution (Raspopovic et al., 2014; Onimaru et al., 2016). In this way, 
dynamical modeling can contribute substantially to homology judgments by providing indirect 
evidence for transitional forms and probabilities of transformations, both for ontogenetic 
processes and their phenotypic outcomes. 
A particularly relevant application of this dynamical “map of the possible” concerns the 
problem of distinguishing homology and homoplasy. As is well known, distinct lineages that 
evolve under the same developmental or functional constraints are prone to evolve the same 
traits independently. For example, similar topological and functional constraints on tetrapod 
limbs have been hypothesized to cause homoplastic similarities in their appendicular 
musculature (Diogo et al., 2013). A map of configuration space not only allows us to assign 
probabilities to possible evolutionary transitions, but also enables us to explore how large the 
range of possible solutions to a problem is to begin with. The space of possibilities for body 
segmentation, for example, is developmentally and functionally highly constrained. Ultimately, 
there are only two viable ways of segmenting a body axis—by serial addition (short-germband) 
or simultaneous subdivision (long-germband). This should make it unsurprising that these 
segmentation modes are subject to repeated homoplastic evolution, especially since transitions 
between these modes are highly likely and can occur in a gradual manner along the embryo’s 
axis, generating the many intermediate forms we observe between the two extremes (Clark et 
al., 2019). The capacity of dynamical systems approaches to model the “space of possibilities” 
for an evolving character gives them a distinct advantage for comparative research compared 
to most other methods of investigating the causes of evolution—including traditional 
mechanistic research that describes only the actual, qualitative causal structure of some 
process (Brigandt, 2013). Obviously, one does not exclude the other, and both approaches are 
best used in a complementary way. 
In this section, we have provided a number of mutually reinforcing criteria for identifying and 
classifying homologous ontogenetic processes, which are summarized in Table 2. The criteria 
are intended to be indicative of relationships of phylogenetic continuity, and can be combined 
as needed with existing phylogenetic methods (such as congruence testing). This indicative role 
of the six criteria also provides a basis for resolving conflicts that arise when some criteria are 
met but others are not. In general, when a given criterion is not met, the process can only be 
homologized if other criteria collectively give sufficient evidence of phylogenetic continuity. 
What counts as “sufficient” evidence, and how the different criteria are to be weighted, are 
questions that must be informed by what is known about the developmental and evolutionary 
biology of the specific process under consideration. We have seen how this works for processes 
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like echinoderm skeletogenesis, insect segmentation, and vertebrate somitogenesis, each of 
which fails some of the criteria for process homology but nonetheless is judged to be a 
homologous process within the relevant monophyletic group. Further progress on the general 
problem of how to establish process homology is unlikely to come in the form of an algorithmic 
inference procedure operating on the evidential criteria (which would be a roundabout way of 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions for process homology). Instead, it is more likely to 
come in the form of empirically-validated theoretical principles that explain how and when the 
features targeted by the criteria (e.g., sameness of parts, outcome, and dynamical properties) 
stick together and when they come apart in evolution (DiFrisco et al. 2020; DiFrisco 
forthcoming). Understanding these principles is a major open task for empirical investigation 
in developmental evolutionary biology. 
Feature of process Evidential criteria of process homology 
Parts 
Gene orthology; homology of cell types, tissues, organs 
(carries more weight for simple processes than complex 
processes). 
Violated by: developmental system drift. 
Outcome 
Homology criteria for structural features (Remane 1952): 
similarity (in special qualities), topological position, 
evidence of transitional forms. 
Violated by: co-option of processes into new roles. 
Topological position 
Sameness of spatiotemporal position and relations with other 
processes within a life-cycle. 
Violated by: heterochrony, heterotopy, serial homology. 
Dynamical properties 
Morphological processes: same as “outcome” above, but for 
temporally extended series of structural features. 
Morphogenetic processes: equivalence classes of configuration 
space topologies. 
Violated by: dynamically dissimilar but homologous 
processes. 
Dynamical complexity 
Complexity of outcome (see “outcome” above); phase space 
dimensionality; topological complexity of phase portrait; 
number of parts, number of dynamical modules. 
Violated by: dynamically simple homologous processes. 
Transitional forms 
Plausible connectability of actually realized processes by 
trajectories in the same configuration space. 
Violated by: transitions not actually realized. 
Table 2. Criteria of process homology based on various features of processes (see text for 
details). 
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
The homology of process has been recognized previously as an important notion for 
comparative and evolutionary biology (Goodwin, 1982, 1994; Webster and Goodwin, 1996; 
Butler and Saidel 2000; Brigandt 2002; Minelli 2003; Scholtz 2005; Love 2007), yet there have 
been few attempts to explicitly develop criteria for process homology and show what work the 
notion can do. Striedter’s (1998) epigenetic concept of homology describes homology in terms 
of the recurring attractor states that determine their outcome. Our criteria for process 
homology can be seen as an elaboration of this approach, which focuses less on the outcome 
and more on the intrinsic dynamics of the processes themselves. Another is the account of 
pathway homology put forward by Gilbert & Bolker (2001). In contrast to this account, we focus 
on a wider range of homology-supporting criteria that go beyond conserved genetic 
composition and structure. 
As our examples from section 2 show, ontogenetic processes constitute a dissociable level in 
evolution that cannot be reduced or traced exclusively in terms of features at other levels (such 
as genes or morphological characters). Thus, ontogenetic processes must be seen as quasi-
independent units of evolutionary comparison just like genes or morphological characters, and 
we need to know what it means to be “the same” process—in the sense of common evolutionary 
ancestry—just as we need to know what it means to be the same gene or the same body part. 
More specifically, homology of process plays two major roles in evolutionary research: (1) it is 
required to shift from characterizing phylogenetic patterns of phenotypic change to causally 
explaining how phenotypic transitions occur in a lineage in terms of changes in the underlying 
generative processes; and (2) it allows us to generalize such “lineage explanations” (Calcott 
2009; DiFrisco and Jaeger 2019) across taxa, yielding “cross-lineage explanations” (see 
Introduction). An example of (1) is the repeated transformation of the ancestral short-
germband mode of segment determination into derived long-germband modes in various 
holometabolous insect lineages that include model organisms such as the jewel wasp Nasonia 
vitripennis, or the vinegar fly Drosophila melanogaster. An example of (2) is the generalization 
of that explanation to lineages not studied in detail (i.e., non-model insects) on the basis of 
homology between the segmentation processes under comparison. These roles for process 
homology are not satisfied by existing phylogenetic approaches working on morphological 
and/or molecular traits. To put it simply, phylogenetic approaches are useful for resolving 
evolutionary patterns, but they tell us little about the underlying processes—and therefore also 
little about the evolutionary patterns of those processes. 
The two roles for process homology we have discussed are not the only potentially fruitful uses 
of the concept.[13] That being said, it is probably not a lack of appreciation that an account of 
process homology would be useful that has caused its historical neglect. It is more likely due to 
uncertainties about how to approach the problem methodologically. From classical anatomy to 
contemporary molecular biology, the concept of homology has traditionally had more affinity 
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to stable structures—the “building blocks” of the phenotype (Wagner 1995)—rather than 
transient activities or “activity-functions” of the underlying generative processes. 
We have explored a way of overcoming these obstacles that combines existing criteria of 
homology (sameness of parts, phenotypic outcome, and topological position) with the formal 
concepts of dynamical systems theory. The latter yield additional criteria of homology—shared 
dynamical properties, dynamical complexity, and transitional forms in configuration space—
that allow developmental processes to be precisely categorized and compared in the context of 
data-driven dynamical modeling. Generic, vaguely-defined processes such as “tissue growth” or 
“convergent extension” will not have determinate homology relations as evaluated by the first 
three criteria. Such generic processes do not have specific identifiable parts, outcomes, or 
relations to other processes. In these cases, it will also be difficult to construct a dynamical 
model of the process which can be validated against experimental evidence to characterize its 
particular dynamical properties. In this way, the six proposed criteria illuminate which 
instances of the seemingly nebulous category of “processes” are homologizable and which are 
not. The central conceptual insight of our proposed dynamical framework is to show that 
processes can be homologized in terms of equivalence classes of configuration space topologies. 
This is crucial for providing an intrinsic description of ontogenetic processes as units of 
homology that does not collapse them into structural “building blocks” at other levels, such as 
molecular components and phenotypic outcomes. In turn, our framework sets the groundwork 
for a comparative biology of developmental dynamics that is consistent with widespread 
developmental system drift and co-option of ontogenetic processes into novel roles and 
contexts. 
The general idea of establishing homology by means of a systematic categorization of 
developmental dynamics amounts to a modern reincarnation of “process structuralism.” As a 
research program, process structuralism sought to revive the pre-Darwinian tradition of 
establishing a “rational taxonomy” for organismic form (reviewed in Webster and Goodwin, 
1982, 1996; Rieppel, 1990; Resnik, 1994). Rational taxonomies provide ahistorical systems of 
morphological classification based on possible transformations between different forms. In the 
process-structuralist version of this project, rational taxonomy is based on transformations 
between the processes that generate morphologies (Goodwin, 1982, Oster & Alberch, 1982, 
Alberch 1991; Webster and Goodwin 1996). It assumes that the space of possible forms is small 
enough that they can be ordered into something like a “periodic table” for ontogeny (Goodwin, 
1982). Homology, according to Goodwin, is “an equivalence relation over the members of a set, 
defined by a transformation that takes any member into any other member within the set” 
(Goodwin 1994, 233; see also Goodwin 1982). Fish fins and tetrapod limbs, for example, “fall 
within particular parameter domains of the same generative space” and can be transformed 
into one another by modification of the generative rules that are generic to limb-forming 
processes (Goodwin 1994, 238).[14] A central aim of this generative classification program is to 
determine the probability of phenotypic transitions in evolution based on the size of dynamic 
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attractors in the space of possible morphologies (ibid.; see also Webster & Goodwin, 1996). In 
this way, it is similar to Striedter’s (1998) epigenetic approach. 
Although there are obvious parallels, our approach differs in significant ways from this project. 
Process structuralists pointed to some of the same explanatory limitations of purely historical 
or pattern-based approaches to evolution as we do, but reacted by embracing the even stricter 
limitations of “ahistorical” biology rather than attempting to synthesize the two.[15] Without 
placing generative processes and forms in their actual phylogenetic sequence, our capacity to 
construct lineage explanations will remain limited to evolutionary changes that are currently 
observable. These extremely (and unnecessarily) restricted cases cannot then be generalized 
to other lineages via shared evolutionary history, but only via abstract “transformations” in 
parameter space. This notion of transformation is not historical or evolutionary, but is 
essentially the notion of transformation from mathematical group theory. 
Although we agree that the presence of possible transitional forms in configuration space 
influences the probabilities of evolutionary change (Section 3.6), these formal representations 
need to be embedded within historical reconstructions of phylogeny. This way, they can serve 
as a guide to understand actual historical transformations—which have an evolutionary 
“polarity” or “historicity”—rather than speculative abstract transformations which are the 
same forwards and backwards in time (despite the fact that, e.g., tetrapod limbs never 
transformed back into fish fins). The problem is that the space of biological possibilities is 
incredibly vast (and impossible to pre-state, see Kauffman, 2014), which means that evolution 
is highly non-ergodic. It explores only a tiny fraction of all possible configurations, which means 
that historical accidents will always play a key role in evolutionary explanations (Kauffman, 
2000; see also Gould, 1989). Because of this, it is more productive to combine the resources 
from historical and “generative” approaches, both pattern and process, for understanding 
developmental dynamics in comparative biology. This requires a notion of process homology 
that is based on both evolutionary history and abstract modeling.[16] 
It is important to emphasize another key difference. The project of rational taxonomy aimed to 
provide a system of classification for forms, or morphologies, and the process structuralist 
version of this project does this in terms of generative processes. The aim of a framework for 
process homology, by contrast, is to classify the processes themselves, not the resulting 
forms.[17] If it is true that processes and forms (“phenotypic outcomes,” as we have called them) 
are dissociable in evolution—through co-option events, for example—then attempting to 
reduce morphological homology to process homology would be ill-advised in many cases. The 
idea of process homology does not revise existing criteria of homology for morphological 
characters, but rather complements them by extending the homology relation to an additional 
level of organization. 
This point is also critical for understanding the relationship between process homology and 
developmental approaches to homology (Van Valen 1982; Roth 1984, 1988; Wagner 1989a, 
28 
1989b, 2007, 2014; Brigandt 2002; 2003). Developmental approaches aim to explain patterns 
of morphological homology in terms of shared underlying developmental mechanisms, 
constraints, or pathways. This project is sometimes interpreted as an alternative 
conceptualization or definition of homology compared to phylogenetic views, but it can also be 
interpreted as a source of explanations for patterns of homology identified by phylogenetic 
methods (Novick 2018; DiFrisco forthcoming). A recent articulation of the latter project by 
Wagner and colleagues is the model of “Character Identity Mechanisms” (ChIMs)—conserved 
modules that are hypothesized to control the identity of individualized morphological 
characters, including cell types, tissues, and organs (DiFrisco et al., 2020). Here again, the 
investigative target is morphological homology, but the proposed developmental model 
ultimately requires establishing homology criteria at the level of the underlying generative 
mechanisms themselves (ChIMs). The idea of process homology complements but only partially 
overlaps with the ChIM research program. Homology between processes is not hypothesized to 
explain morphological character identity. Because ChIMs do have this explanatory role, they are 
not dissociable from their outcomes as ontogenetic processes are. Accordingly, ChIMs 
represent a special subset of the broader category of developmental mechanisms (Love, 
2018)—i.e., those mechanisms that can play this role of underwriting character identity 
(DiFrisco et al., 2020; cf. Wagner, 2014). Ontogenetic processes are therefore a broader 
category that includes activities that do not have that role and are not ChIM-like: for example, 
segmentation clocks, vascular morphogenesis, life cycle traits, and transient embryonic 
processes (see DiFrisco et al., 2020). Both frameworks align in the broad project of 
comparative-mechanistic biology, of developing causal explanatory models of homology at the 
neglected intermediate levels between genes and morphology (see also DiFrisco & Jaeger, 2019, 
2020). 
This project is a forward-looking one that still largely remains to be carried out. But the tools 
for doing so are now within our reach. The comparative study of ontogenetic processes will 
usually require that researchers have substantial background knowledge of the systems under 
study—not just genomic or phylogenetic data, but appropriate validated models of complex 
nonlinear regulatory processes. Therefore, it is no accident that our central examples are drawn 
from well-studied model systems. However, as evidence on the homology of ontogenetic 
processes increasingly accumulates in non-model organisms at multiple levels of organization, 
it is useful to have a theoretical framework that can be used both to interpret the existing data 
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[1] A brief note on terminology: we use “ontogenetic processes” as a broad category that not only 
includes development in a narrow sense, but all processes—metabolic, physiological, 
developmental, and even behavioral—that contribute to the closure of the life cycle. 
[2] We use the term “mechanism” in the sense of Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2010), Bechtel 
(2011), Love (2018), and DiFrisco and Jaeger (2019) as denoting a group of parts and activities 
whose spatiotemporal organization and dynamics explains some system behavior. Since 
mechanisms involve causal activities or dynamics, all mechanisms include processes. Unlike 
mechanisms, processes are descriptively invariant to changes in parts or components. So, 
according to our terminology, the process of somitogenesis is conserved in vertebrates even 
though many of the genetic components involved differ among vertebrate clades, but the 
genetic mechanism is not conserved. As we argue, the fact that the identity of a process is not 
fixed by the components involved makes processes well-suited to constitute a dissociable level 
or unit of evolutionary comparison. 
[3] Dynamical modules are defined as distinguishable temporal activities that correspond to 
particular behaviors within the broader dynamic repertoire of a complex regulatory process. 
This concept is elaborated in more detail elsewhere (Jaeger and Monk, 2021, and this issue). 
For our present purposes, it suffices to emphasize that distinct modular activities can be picked 
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out from the complex overall behavior of a dynamic system, even if those activities interact in 
various non-trivial ways, and are not necessarily based on any strict underlying structural 
modularity in the regulatory network. 
[4] In most current models of somitogenesis, this wavefront is represented as a concentration 
threshold in a long-range morphogen gradient that moves towards the posterior as the 
presomitic mesoderm grows (see, for example, Oates et al. 2012; Richmond and Oates 2012; 
Hubaud and Pourquié, 2014). An alternative model postulates a more local self-organising 
mechanism (Cotterell et al. 2015). At a more abstract level, and independent of the exact 
mechanism, the wavefront can be seen as some type of bifurcation event—governing a 
transition from oscillatory to stable gene expression behaviour (Cooke and Zeeman 1976)—
which moves posteriorly at a fixed distance from the tip of the growing tissue. The possibility 
of different underlying mechanisms actually underscores our argument for the dissociability of 
evolution at different levels of organisation.  
[5] Whether the common ancestor of vertebrates and insects was segmented or not is still open 
to debate (Couso, 2009, Chipman, 2010, Graham et al., 2014, Clark et al. 2019). There are 
individual regulatory factors whose structure and/or developmental role in segmentation 
appear to be conserved. Examples are the homology between Hes/Her transcription factors in 
vertebrates and the Drosophila pair-rule gene hairy, or the involvement of Notch-Delta signaling 
in the segmentation clock of spiders, cockroaches, and vertebrates. Whether or not these rather 
isolated cases of homology constitute evidence for more systemic deep homology between 
vertebrate and invertebrate segmentation remains contested. Further evidence in intermediate 
clades will be required to resolve this issue. 
[6] Holometabolous insects (such as butterflies, bees, and ants) are those that have larval stages, 
and a true metamorphosis between the last larval and the adult stage (Grimaldi and Engel, 
2005). 
[7] Cyclorrhaphan flies are a sub-clade of the unfortunately named brachyceran “higher flies”, 
which are contrasted to nematoceran midges and mosquitoes. Cyclorrhapha are characterised 
by their larval stages (called maggots) which have their heads turned inside-out (like a folded 
sock) such that their mouth (instead of their sense organs) comes to lie at the very anterior tip 
of their body (Grimaldi and Engel, 2005). 
[8] The situation is slightly complicated in the case of the sea urchin: its larval skeleton could be 
considered a kind of serial homolog of the adult skeleton. However, serial homology is a difficult 
and controversial topic in the field of homology research, and a discussion of the serial 
homology of processes would go beyond the scope of this article. For our current argument, it 
is sufficient to consider that there is no equivalent structure to the larval skeleton outside the 
sea urchin lineage. It is in this sense that we consider the outcome of the larval process non-
homologous to adult skeletogenesis. 
39 
[9] Another violation of topological position occurs with serial homology, or iterated characters 
within the same organism. If one wishes to establish serial homology between ontogenetic 
processes, the criterion of having the same topological position would have to be modified 
appropriately—for example, to having positions that are symmetrical relative to major body 
planes. 
[10] Differential equations are the most commonly used formalism, but other (e.g. discrete or 
stochastic) frameworks are also important (see De Jong, 2002; Wilkinson, 2009; Ay and Arnosti, 
2011; Machado et al., 2011). The concepts we introduce here are independent of the exact 
mathematical formalism. For an accessible introduction to the concepts of dynamical systems 
theory, see Strogatz (2015). 
[11] Note that structural stability is always relative to specific changes in variable or parameter 
values. A system can be structurally stable with regard to some such changes, but not others. 
[12] Note that dynamical complexity as defined here is different from the notion of a complex 
process introduced in section 3.2. Complex processes in the latter sense are those arising from 
the interactions of multiple components (similar only to factor 4 in the list in this section). This 
distinction is made to contrast complex with simple activities that are generated by a single 
unified entity. Somewhat confusingly, simple activities can be dynamically complex. An extreme 
example is provided by animal or human behavior, which can be exceedingly complex in a 
dynamical sense, while still being simple, because there is a single unified entity (an organism 
or person) that carries it out. For establishing process homology in practice, there is very little 
danger of confusion, as only the dynamical notion of complexity is used as a criterion, while we 
use the distinction between simple and complex activities to motivate our account of process 
homology in the first place. 
[13] One additional role investigated elsewhere is establishing the homology of life cycle traits 
such as metamorphosis, metagenesis, and asexual reproduction (which are processes; DiFrisco 
2019). Another potentially fruitful role would be to account for homology of neurophysiological 
processes, which may be particularly useful for generalizing research on model systems to 
human brains in situations where experimentation on humans is not possible for ethical 
reasons. In addition, it may be ultimately necessary to ground certain behavioral homologies 
on homology of neural excitation dynamics, which can be decoupled from anatomical neural 
homology. 
[14] Interestingly, Goodwin (1994, 237) distinguished four “levels” in the hierarchy of 
morphogenetic fields active in the limb-formation process. Goodwin’s morphogenetic fields are 
equivalent to our developmental modules (see Jaeger and Monk, 2021; and this issue), 
[15] “History is not explanatory of form because it does not describe the generative processes 
that make different forms possible.” (Goodwin 1994, 239). Historical explanations are not 
considered valid scientific explanations at all by the process structuralists. 
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[16] This point is also made by Striedter (1998). For a more detailed critical discussion of process 
structuralism, see Griffiths (1996). 
[17] Striedter’s (1998) account lies somewhere in between, considering the homology of process 
but using phenotypic outcomes (determined by attractors) as the only criterion for 
classification. 
 
